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                                                            Abstract 
 
We propose an empirical econometric panel data model to test deregulation and regional 
market structure effects on district heating prices in Finland 1996-2002. The data consists of 
76 district heating firms in Finland. Special emphasis is put on the modeling of policy 
induced competition started in year 1999, regional based fuel selection, market structure, and 
distribution network sharing effects on district heating prices. The results imply that the local 
structures of energy production and selling have an important role on market prices and the 
price lowering effects of energy market deregulation have been permanent.     
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I. Introduction  
After decades of state ownership and heavy government regulation heat and power sectors 
worldwide are being deregulated. Finland is not exception in this global wave. However in 
Finland, a sparse inhabited country, the implementation of policy change is demanding task.   
The national energy markets are still typically dominated by a small number of producers. 
Even large geographic areas are dominated by one firm. When analysis is focused on the 
district heating markets, the restructuring can even be impossible. The reason for this meager 
result hinges on the general and specific features of Finnish electricity and district heating 
markets.  
 
Generally market power is a prominent issue in the current debate about electricity and heat 
industry restructuring. Increasing the number of sellers in a market does not necessarily 
reduce market power as the standard theory suggest. Location advantages, contracts and 
vertical integration allow some firms to maintain profits and prices near to monopoly levels 
even the seller concentration is at levels generally considered competitive. In electricity 
markets independent national transmission system with enough capacity allows for local 
competition from companies outside. In contrary to this presence of transmission bottlenecks 
and peak load periods may induce temporal local market power even for a firm with small 
market share. However in district heating markets the heat transmission network is highly 
localized and no interconnections are technically or economically feasible over larger areas. 
Only in some big towns and in highly urbanized regions many producers may share the same 
network. Notice also that in some cases energy input substitution is possible for the small 
house owners. However the change of the form of energy input for warming in the highly 
horizontally and vertically integrated markets is not necessarily a competitive increasing act. 
Also the restructuring gain of firms to producer, distribution and retail seller markets is low if 
the number of firms is already low in the local markets.  
 
In following we analyze in details the Finnish district heating markets in years 1996-2002 
with a firm level data. Our theoretical background is in the industrial organization literature 
(IO) that stresses the importance of firm’s market share on its pricing policy. We build an 
empirical econometric model that focuses on three specific pricing effects in connection to 
the firm’s market share in energy production and retail markets: the effects competition 
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induced policy reform, the effects of sharing distribution network, and the effects of regional 
based fuel dependency.    
 
The household electricity markets in Finland were opened to competition in the 1st of 
November 1998. Regulation was only extended to limit the unreasonable pricing and to 
separate the different business units (production, distribution and sales). However the district 
heating industry is still simply regulated by the general Competition Laws. The policy 
induced competition in the electricity industry in late 1998 is expected to affect the district 
heating industry since both industries compete in the same heating goods markets. The 
industry is also constantly monitored and faces a threat of intensive regulation by the state 
authorities. The price effects of induced competition are modelled in regression model 
framework with different trend break and dummy variable specifications.   
 
Geographically household heating product markets are limited to the area which is covered 
by the local district heating (warm water) pipe network. In Finland, most district heat 
companies are isolated from each other. Typically they have a local monopoly both in heat 
distribution and production. Many companies also produce both heat and electricity (CHP). 
A distribution company may also have no own production at all. These companies have the 
monopoly in heat distribution and they usually buy the district heat from separate producer. 
Still there exist some regions where the district heating network is shared by different 
production or distribution companies. All these market structures are expected to have effects 
on competition and prices in the wholesale and retail heat markets. These prices effects are 
analyzed by adding to estimated models firm’s market share (both in production and heat sale 
markets) in local markets. An interaction model alternative is estimated also where network 
sharing dummy variable interacts with other model variables. The estimates test the 
extension of network sharing firms’ different response to control variables. The network 
effects are also connected to regional analysis.           
 
The regional pricing structure is also affected by the fuel type used by the local district 
heating company. In the Northern and Eastern Finland where winters are colder than in the 
other parts of Finland the heat production differs from the rest of country. The price of fuels 
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is important in regional context. Natural gas is supplied (from Russia) only to the Southern 
Finland, peat and wood are used mainly in the Eastern and Northern Finland, and coal is the 
main fuel input on the coastal area (western Finland). We build a (3x2) -cross-classifying 
dummy variable reflecting the regional location and network sharing in these regions. This 
solution enables us to test at same time the network and regional specific price effects.  
 
The structure of paper is as follows. Section 2 gives shot review non-competitive aspects of 
energy pricing related to economy theory. Section 3 gives a closer look at Finnish district 
heating markets. Section 4 introduces our econometric methods, specifications with relevant 
pricing variables, and hypotheses tests. Section 5 focuses on the obtained results, and Section 
6 concludes the paper. Appendices I-II provide a more detailed picture of econometric model 
specification used in the study. Appendices III-IV report the analyzed data and some 
supplementary regression results.  
 
2. Economic theory  
Earlier energy and heat production and distribution were considered to be public utilities that 
provided their services equally to all members of society, both to industry and to private 
consumers. The target was delivery security, smoothed prices and tariffs, and equal access. 
This “public goods” framework was understandable in political climate of era 1950-1970. 
Also the huge grounding costs of energy plants and distribution networks supported the 
public solution to the development of energy sector. Since 1980’s the political climate has 
changed toward private market solutions emphasizing the importance of market based 
pricing rules, competition and efficiency in production and distribution. Privatization and 
deregulation were seen as policy alternatives for these targets. The case of natural 
monopolies with price regulation and subsidies were buried as the huge grounding costs were 
paid after decades of operation. The case of small and declining fixed costs was the new 
paradigm leading to the marginal cost price rule supported by competitive markets.  However 
the privatization is not a necessary - not even sufficient condition - for market based solution 
to energy pricing.  The real question is the market structure, i.e. number of operating firms in 
the markets, not the ownership form of the firms. Monopoly or what ever other non-
competitive price conduct can be formulated without reference to the ownership of firms. In 
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theory all of many companies in the competitive market can be public owned or in the other 
end we have only one private owned monopoly. However in reality, especially in energy 
markets with their background in public (natural) monopolies, things are more complicated 
with localized markets, weak product substitution of energy products, and with horizontal 
and vertical integration of markets.  
 
The case of pure monopoly is well-formulated in economic theory. The monopoly sets its 
product price above the competitive efficient market price and naturally sells less. The 
monopoly facing the whole local market demand curve can conduct price discrimination 
leading to increased output. This social gain is however small compared to the total 
monopoly loss due the monopoly pricing. When the number of firms in the market increases, 
the number of firms matter, but also their relative market shares play a crucial role. The 
oligopoly is an interesting case with dynamic rivalry. In pure theory co-operative solution 
boils down to cartel solution having price conduct of multi-plant monopolist. The non co-
operative case leads us to many solutions and concepts of game theory. Typically in this 
literature conditions for the equilibrium with stability are demanding and refer to few cases 
found in real markets. Because of complexity of the issue there is no reason why price should 
fall to the level where it equals marginal cost. The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, where price is 
decision variable in homogenous product oligopoly, is the exception. When number of 
players increases the role of relative magnitude of players (i.e. market shares) is important for 
market pricing. With high entry costs and with some product differentiation the dominant   
firm can still behave close to monopoly (Waterson 1984, Tirole 1989).  
 
In the context of energy markets the product differentiation is not so important issues as the 
vertical integration. Typically the same company owns the production, distribution and 
selling of the energy to end users. In some cases the company may also be a multi-product 
company, i.e. producing, distributing and selling electricity and heat.  However from the 
viewpoint end users the substitution possibilities are very limited as they are constrained by 
prevailing distribution network in supply only to one alternative. Although the substitution 
possibilities existed the vertically integrated multi-product monopoly controls the price 
setting in the every dimension of markets with cumulative price markups. The opposite ideal 
position is obtained when all vertical stages of energy product markets are independent and 
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competitive. The case stands up as theoretical curiosity, and practical restructuring of energy 
markets have only stressed the importance of separating the energy production (generation) 
and distribution (transmission). Oligopoly markets with multi-product industries lead to 
interesting market solutions depending on the complementarities in inputs and outputs (Iossa 
1999, Laffont & Martimont 1997 and 2000, Jansen et al. 2006).  
 
The base level restructuring is typically augmented with by breaking up large dominant 
production plants to smaller independent units by privatization and building up auction 
markets for energy demand and selling units (mostly for electricity) that reflect almost the 
real time demand and supply conditions.  These both solutions can been seen as methods to 
improve the market mechanism to operate efficiently. However the end users’ demand price 
elasticity is typically very low although wholesale prices may fluctuate greatly by hour to 
hour in wholesale markets. This means that market power in retail markets can have little 
effect on short-run consumption quantity and allocative efficiency.  The optimal market 
design, at least for electricity markets, is a complex and multidimensional challenge. The 
pros and cons of different designs are still under heat debate (see e.g. Harris 2006, Wilson 
2002, Cavanagh & Sonstelie 1998, Borenstein et al. 2002).                         
 
3. Finnish district heat markets  
Although the aspects of location independency of production and distribution network are 
more important in the district heating markets than in the electricity markets, the above 
market complexity is not redundant, at least in Finland, for district heating markets.  First, the 
heat producing companies are in multiple ways integrated to other power markets. Many 
firms produce also other forms of energy and are connected to national electricity network. 
Second, ownership structure is strongly vertically and horizontally integrated. Small 
suburban areas and towns have typically only one heat producer with its own distribution 
network. The retail selling company is operated by same local private or public owned firm. 
In some cases the companies are independent and owned by large national level companies. 
Also the contractual forms, deliberately suppressing market mechanisms, between the firms 
in vertical, horizontal, and spatial dimensions can be many.  Third, the geographical location 
of heat producing unit determines what raw material inputs it uses. In the Southern Finland 
firms typically use natural gas as input, but in the coastal regions coal and oil is still used, 
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and in northern parts of country peat and wood (woodchips) are the main inputs. Still the heat 
company and market heterogeneity can be extended by production scale and product 
differentiation aspects. Typically big plants are more efficient (economies of scale) and they 
have combined energy production (CHP, combined heat and power production). Different 
prices are exercised on the different end users, i.e. the prices of heat (and electricity) are 
different for small private houses, apartment block and industrial buildings. The price 
differences are mostly based on different tax rules, but quantity discounts are also used.   
District heating is the most important heating good in Finland. It is the primary heating 
system in 48 % of the Finnish buildings.  Both electricity and light fuel oil has a 17 % market 
share in the heating goods markets. Due to the Northern European weather conditions there is 
a demand for heating for 7 – 10 months in a year. District heating industry can be defined as 
production and distribution of hot water for central heating purposes in a heating network. In 
2005, the total district heating production was 32.2 TWh1. The share of CHP production was 
74 % and separate production 26 % of district heating.  However the number of CHP 
companies was about 20 % of total district heating companies. The district heating industry is 
quite heterogeneous. There are only few large energy companies participating both in 
electricity and district heating markets. Thus the energy market deregulation of act started in 
year 1999 must have some effects on the heat prices also. Figure 1. illustrates operating of 
the average district heating company in Finland.  
The district heating company can be theoretically divided to production, distribution, and 
sales business. Still most of the district heating companies are vertically integrated. In many 
small companies the maintenance services of the distribution network are outsourced. In 
some municipalities also the production business is separated to an own company so that the 
district heating water is produced in different industrial company, which production process 
produces hot water as side product, or production units are divided to an independent 
production companies. These independent production companies do not usually own any 
distribution network.  The distribution network business includes network building, main-
tenance, and the distribution of district heating. The sales business includes purchases of 
district heating, sales, and marketing of district heating services to the customer (small 
private houses and apartment block). Note that the sales business contracts only with the end-
                                                 
1 TWh = terawatt hour i.e. 1 TWh = 1 000 GWh = 1 000 000 MWh 
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user customer. However the sales business is typically not separated from distribution 
business.  
                                Figure 1. District heating company  
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4. Modeling price setting in district heating firms   
Our data consist of 76 district firms (90% of all firms) in Finland during time period 1996-
2002. Thus our sample consists of 532 observations.  Appendix III gives more detailed 
description of data. Target is to model price setting behaviour of firms in the end-user 
markets with industrial organization features reviewed above. We build a panel data 
regression model for observed market retail prices explained with variables describing the 
firm’s level of vertical and horizontal integration, geographical location, raw material costs, 
network sharing, joint production (CHP), production scale, and ownership structure of the 
firms.  The model specification is derived from the principles of empirical IO-literature  (see, 
e.g. Bresnahan1989, Cubbin 1988, Reiss & Wolak 2005).  
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The variables are defined as  
Price variables:    
                      =  price of district heating for small (single) family houses (€/kWt) ,
SMA
i tP
                     ,
APA
i tP  = price of district heating for apartment houses  (€/kWt) 
Vertical and horizontal integration variables:  
               ,
MS
i tPROD  =  firm’s market share in district heat production (0-100%) 
           ,
MS
i tSMALL  =  firm’s market share in energy retail markets of  
                                    small family houses (0-100%) 
         ,
MS
i tAPART  =  firm’s market share in energy retail markets of  
                                   apartment houses (0-100%) 
                    =  dummy variable for joint production of electricity and heat  ,i tCHP
                                   (1 = joint production, 0 = heat production)    
               ,i tJOINT   =   dummy variable for joint retail selling of electricity and heat  
                                      (1 = joint retail selling, 0 = only heat selling)    
              =  number of  wholesale suppliers that the retail seller has (0,1,..,N) ,i jSUPPLY
         =  dummy variable of distribution network sharing  ,i tNETWORK
                                     (1 = firm shares network other firms, 0 = no sharing) *)   
 
Geographical location:  
 
           ,i tLOCATION  =  dummy variable for firm’s geographical location reflecting the local 
                                       raw material dependency (0=south, 1=coast, 2= east and north) *) 
 
Ownership:  
 
                = dummy variable for firm’s ownership (1 =  public, 0 = private) ,i tPUBLIC
             =  dummy variable for firm’s  ownership structure (1 = part of  ,i tCOMPANY
                                       larger company, 0 = not part of larger company)  
 
Firm’s scale:  
 
                     = the scale of production or retail selling of district heat (GWt)      ,i tSCALE
 
 
____________________________ 
*)   These variables were connected together as two-dimensional dummy variable,  
      , describing dependency between firm’s location and network sharing (see kmD
       Appendix I for more details) 
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Input costs:  
 
              ,i tFUELCOST  = the unit cost of fuel input of producer company (if the company  
                                          is sole retail seller or distribution company variable gets the  
                                          value of this company’s major heat supplier)     
 
Competition: 
                     1999
0,   when 1999
       
1,   when  1999
t
TRL
t
<⎧= ⎨ ≥⎩
                                      =   a trend level shift variable that describes the price effect of   
                                           deregulation of Finnish energy  markets starting in year 1999.    
   
Our base line model has the from of (expect that , 1
MS
i tAPART −  is used instead of , 1
MS
i tSMALL −  for 
apartment house specification)  
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j
i t i tT u
t i j
+
= = =
,
 
TRt  in a common time trend variable for  all firms describing the common time depended  
price effects. One period lagged endogeneous variable is also included in the model as price 
dynamics are quite slow in district heating retail markets. Typically the firms change their 
prices only on yearly basis.  Notice also that market share variables are lagged with one 
period. The price setting is one strategic variable in rivalry for market shares. Now the lagged 
share variables exclude the effects from prices to market shares. Thus the used specification 
is not sensitive to endogeneity specification bias. Note that we use also GMM –estimation 
method in panel setting (Arellano 2003). In this case market share variables are not lagged 
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with one period but we use instrumental variable estimation method (i.e. GMM) to solve the 
endogeneity problem. iα  is the firm specific (fixed or random) component that models the 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. Finally uit is normally and independently distributed error 
term with common variance, 2(0, )it uu N σ∼ .  
 
We estimate different specifications of above model in pooled and panel data settings 
emphasizing the time dependent policy changes in the sample period, and regional network 
sharing classifying price effects  (see Appendix II for different specifications).  In order 
to study more closely the network-sharing effects the model was augmented with interaction 
terms between  and other right hand side variables (excluding ’s and 
kmD
,i tNETWORK kmD
, 1
j
i tP − ). This specification enables us to test if the possible network-sharing effects are only 
location specific or they have more general pricing effects, i.e. the network-sharing firms’ 
pricing policy with respect to their market and production structure imply different energy 
prices compared to non network-sharing firms.  
 
5. Results  
5.1. Small house pricing  
We first pay attention to regional differences in pricing. Table 1a. reports the standard OLS 
model estimates and interaction OLS-model estimates for pooled data. Results indicate that 
there exist regional price differences for small houses. The estimates for D00,...,D21 show 
tendency that firms located  in the Eastern or Northern Finland (D20,D21), using mainly 
wood and peat based material input in heat production, have the lowest retail energy prices. 
However if the firm is a distribution network-sharing firm (Di1, i=01,2) this does not lower 
the price. Notice that this result does not mean that price differences between network-
sharing and non-network-sharing firms are non-existing. The parameter equality tests for 
estimates of D00,...,D21 in Tables 1b-1c. indicate clearly that relevant pricing differences are 
found among the firms depending on their geographical location and network-sharing 
possibilities. However there are no systematic differences over the regions for network-
sharing. Note that the “long run” level estimates of D00,...,D21 are obtained  by adjusting the 
estimates with the price dynamics estimate, e.g. D00LR=9.34/(1-0.77) = 40.6.  Appendix IV  
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      Table 1a. Pooled OLS-estimates of small house energy price setting  
 
 Variable                            estimate    t-value1)           estimate      t-value1) 
, 1
SMALL
i tP −                                   0.77       (17.31*)              0.76        (16.53*) 
 D00                                      9.34        (4.03*)              9.90          (4.02*) 
 D01                                      8.35        (3.27*)            13.44          (4.81*) 
 D10                                      9.33        (3.95*)              9.96          (3.91*) 
 D11                                    12.66        (4.37*)              5.94          (0.78) 
 D20                                      8.43        (4.02*)              9.00          (3.98*) 
 D21                                      8.75        (4.01*)              4.25          (1.54) 
 TR                                        0.44         (2.74*)             0.34          (1.91*) 
 TRL1999                               -0.82       (-1.71*)            -0.48          (-0.89) 
, 1
MS
i tPROD −                               1.21        (1.72*)              1.34          (1.77*) 
, 1
MS
i tSMALL −                            -6.06       (-2.41*)            -8.75         (-2.85*) 
,i tCHP                                    0.49         (1.10)               0.33           (0.63) 
,i tJOINT                                0.55          (1.09)               0.38           (0.62) 
,i jSUPPLY                           -0.04        (-0.01)               0.01           (0.00) 
,i tPUBLIC                           -0.01        (-0.03)               0.10           (0.19) 
,i tCOMPANY                        0.67         (0.71)                1.13           (1.06) 
,i tSCALE                              -0.01       (-0.22)                0.08           (1.57) 
,i tFUELCOST                       0.13         (3.04*)              0.14           (2.70*) 
,i tNETWORK *TR                                                         1.19           (4.10*) 
,i tNETWORK *TRL1999                                                -2.73          (-2.90*) 
,i tNETWORK * , 1
MS
i tPROD −                                              4.06            (1.39) 
,i tNETWORK * , 1
MS
i tSMALL −                                          38.57            (1.57) 
,i tNETWORK *                                                 -7.85           (-2.08*) ,i tCHP
,i tNETWORK * ,i tJOINT                                             -2.44           (-1.48)                               
,i tNETWORK *                                           5.94            (1.80*) ,
F
i jSUPPLY
,i tNETWORK *                                           1.85            (1.12) ,i tPUBLIC
,i tNETWORK *                                      -7.00          (-4.05*) ,i tCOMPANY
,i tNETWORK *                                            -0.15           (-2.40*) ,i tSCALE
,i tNETWORK * ,i tFUELCOST                                    -0.17           (-2.80*) 
 R2                                                                                     0.793                               0.799 
 Breusch-Pagan heterog. test  : 226.2*          :   260.9* 2 (17)χ 2 (27)χ
 BJ normality test                     : 415.1*             :  487.2* 2 (2)χ 2 (2)χ
  Durbin Watson test                               2.43                                2.36 
 1) t-values corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 *) significant at 10% level   
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Table 1b. Tests for equality of distribution network-sharing and regional  
                 specific effects (p-values in parenthesis) 
 
Overall equality: 
D00=D10=D20= 
D01=D11=D21 
Regional equality: 
D00=D10=D20, 
D01=D11=D21 
Network sharing / non sharing  
equality: 
D00=D01,D10=D11,D20=D21 
2 (5) 16.92   (0.005)χ =
 
2 (4) 14.26   (0.006)χ =
 
2 (3) 13.16   (0.004)χ =  
 
 
Table 1c. Tests for equality of distribution network sharing and regional  
                specific effects in interaction model (p-values in parenthesis) 
 
Overall equality: 
D00=D10=D20= 
D01=D11=D21 
Regional equality: 
D00=D10=D20, 
D01=D11=D21 
Network sharing / non sharing  
equality: 
D00=D01,D10=D11,D20=D21 
2 (5) 19.32   (0.001)χ =
 
2 (4) 8.73   (0.009)χ =       2 (3) 13.31   (0.004)χ =
 
 
 
reports the unbalanced panel estimation results where variables D00,...,D21 build up six 
regional-network specific cross sections  in the panel setting. The estimation results are in 
line with Table 1a. results but some positive price effects mount from the firm being  part of  
larger company.  
 
Before analyzing in details the remaining results we notice that our estimation results are 
greatly harmed by residual heteroskedasticity and non-normality. The firm level hetero-
geneity of our sample is not controlled in the OLS-model estimation for pooled data. To 
secure consistent t-values we used heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (White’s 
diagonal moment matrix correction).  
 
The second part of Table 1. reports the results from interaction model where we let network-
sharing dummy to interact with explanatory variables. The specification reveals the 
differences between network-sharing and non network-sharing firms’ energy pricing 
explained by the “structural” variables. The results indicate that network-sharing firms react 
differently to these variables compared to non-sharing firms. Generally the pricing effects 
among the network-sharing firms are amplified but some network-sharing firm specific 
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effects are also found,  e.g. joint production of electricity and heat among the network-
sharing firms ( *  - variable) decreases energy prices. Likewise if the 
firms is part of larger company ( * ), and if the production scale of 
firm is large ( * ) the energy prices are lower.  However contrary to 
theoretical arguments, the number of wholesale suppliers *   
increases, and the unit cost of fuel input of network-sharing producer company 
* ) depresses prices.    
,i tNETWORK ,i tCHP
,i tNETWORK ,i tCOMPANY
,i tNETWORK ,i tSCALE
,( i tNETWORK , )i jSUPPLY
,( i tNETWORK ,i tFUELCOST
 
The results from first difference and panel data model estimates are found in  Tables 2 and 3. 
At this moment we not analyze results in different tables in details. Instead we focus on the    
 
 
Table 2. First difference OLS model estimates of small house energy  
               price setting  
 
Variable                            estimate    t-value1)           estimate      t-value1) 
 
                                                   1997-2002                    1998-1999 
 
Constant                                  1.68         (6.88*)          -0.82         (-1.96*) 
, 1
SMALL
i tP −Δ                                   -0.37       (-3.91*)           0.07           (0.50) 
 D1999                                      -1.85       (-4.99*)                                         
, 1
MS
i tPROD −Δ                               3.13         (2.17*)            0.01           (0.21) 
, 1
MS
i tSMALL −Δ                            15.72         (2.07*)        -58.01          (-0.44) 
,i tCHPΔ                                   -0.36        (-0.34)             0.53           (0.46) 
,i tPUBLICΔ                             1.05          (3.82)                                            
,i tCOMPANYΔ                         1.88          (0.81)            -0.71         (-2.05*) 
,i tSCALEΔ                               0.43          (3.21*)           -3.42         (-2.07*) 
,i tFUELCOSTΔ                       -0.05        (-0.83)              0.05           (0.35) 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 R2                                                                                     0.138                              0.086 
 Breusch-Pagan heterog. test    :  44.46*            :    7.87* 2 (9)χ 2 (7)χ
 BJ normality test                    :  201.11*         :   116.21* 2 (2)χ 2 (2)χ
 Durbin Watson test                               2.15                                  -  
 1) t-values corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 *) significant at 10% level   
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sum-up of parameter estimates from different model specifications (see Table 4).  Table 
reports  + symbol if positive estimate of parameter value at 10% significance level is 
obtained, - symbol when negative pricing effects is found, and the cell is empty when the 
estimate is insignificant. Note that some 0/1 dummy variables are not included in all 
estimations because of their lack of variability. The last column of Table 4. reports the 
summary over different estimation. Parentheses are used if less or equal to three significant 
estimates are found. We consider these cases non-significant in terms of economic arguments 
with low level of robustness. The major concern in Table 4. is the energy price effects of 
induced competition started in year 1999 measured by the trend level shift variable .  1999TRL
 
 
Table 3.  Panel model estimates of small house energy price setting  
 
Variable               estimate   t-value1)     estimate   t-value1)      estimate   t-value1) 
 
                             fixed effects model         random effects model         GMMRE2) 
 
Constant                 34.45       (8.37*)           5.93       (3.40*)         16.51      (2.50*) 
, 1
SMALL
i tP −                       0.23       (3.31*)           0.83      (21.26*)          0.55      (3.38*) 
 TR                           1.10        (5.87*)           0.36       (2.18*)           0.67      (2.76*) 
 TRL1999                  -1.86      (-3.83*)         -0.69       (-1.45)           -1.25    (-1.80*) 
, 1
MS
i tPROD −                 2.54        (1.89*)           0.58        (1.00)            2.09      (1.85*) 
, 1
MS
i tSMALL −              17.23         (2.31*)        -6.83      (-2.50*)        -17.89    (-2.17*) 
,i tCHP                      0.93          (1.33)            0.96       (2.35*)           1.55      (1.93*) 
,i tPUBLIC               -4.78       (-2.78*)           0.42       (1.06)             0.98      (2.05*) 
,i tCOMPANY           0.75          (0.67)           0.59         (0.73)            0.71      (0.77) 
,i tSCALE                 0.66          (3.83*)          0.01        (0.98)            0.01       (0.62) 
,i tFUELCOST          0.14         (2.72*)          0.14        (3.19*)          0.23       (2.59*) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
  R2                                                 0.866                            0.785                            0.727     
  Durbin Watson test       2.15                              2.37                             1.66 
       BJ normality test : 432.4*        :  416.21*           :  516.21*         2 (2)χ 2 (2)χ 2 (2)χ
 1) t-values corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 2) J-statistics for instrumental adequacy:                                        2 (17) 8.09 χ =
     Instrument list: All trend, 0/1 variables and lags 1-2  
     of right hand side variables 
 *) significant at 10% level   
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Also the price effects of firm’s district heat production share and energy retail market share 
variables ,
MS
i tPROD  and  ,
MS
i tSMALL  are important. Results in Table 4 confirm that the 
deregulation act in the Finnish electricity markets started in 1999 had a price decreasing 
effect on district heating prices. The effect was a permanent downward level shift in general 
positive price trend. The incidence of change was on the network-sharing firms (see Table 
1a). The estimated average magnitude of energy price decrease in year 1999 was close to 
2.00 euros/kWt.  The firm’s share of production of district heat in the localized markets has a 
positive effect on the energy price. Thus the production market power increases the energy 
price level. The estimated average long run price effect is close to 3 euros/kWt. However the 
firm’s market share in district heat retail markets has opposite price effects depending in the 
model/estimation used. The outcome is disturbing reflecting the fact that estimation results 
are partly model specification dependent. Similar effects are also found for the scale variable. 
However the price effects of primary fuel cost are positive. Note that if the firm is 
distribution network-sharing firm the fuel cost effects are hampered.  The results may reflect 
the fact that network-sharing companies must be more cost-effective than non-network-
sharing ones.     
 
 
    Table 4. Sum-up of small house energy pricing estimation results  
 
method/ 
variable 
OLS OLS / 
interac.
1st diff 
97-02 
1st diff 
98-99  
Panel
FE 
Panel 
RE 
Panel 
GMM 
Total
 
TR   +    +/+     +    n.i    +     +    +   + 
TRL1999   -      /-     -     -    -      -    - 
MSPROD     +    +/     +      +     +   + 
SMALLMS   -    -/     +     +     -     -   ±
CHP      /-       +    +  ( )  ±
JOINT      n.i    n.i   n.i    n.i   n.i  
SUPPLY      /+    n.i    n.i   n.i   n.i   n.i  (+) 
PUBLIC       +    n.i    -     + ( ) ±
COMPANY       /-      -     (-) 
SCALE       /-     +     -    +     ±
FUELCOST   +    +/-      +    +    +  + 
    (n.i. = not included in the model)  
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The rest of results in Table 4. lack stability and robustness. However if we overvalue the 
results we notice that firm being part of larger company has a price depressing effect. Also if 
the firm production structure allows for CHP-production it is expected to have negative price 
effects. This result is confirmed by OLS-estimation and -stratification panel estimation 
results found in Appendix IV. However a firm selling both electricity and heat has no retail 
price effects.   
kmD
 
5.2. Apartment house pricing  
On general level results for apartment houses are close to small house results (see Tables 5-
8). However some differences are found. First, no regional or network-sharing price 
difference effects are found (see Tables 6b-c). The result may be an outcome of less 
competition found in the apartment house energy retail product markets compared to small 
house markets where energy input substitution possibilities also exist. Apartment house 
markets are more concentrated that the small house markets (see Appendix III). The 
argument is supported by the weak evidence that market share of firm in energy retail 
markets has price increasing effect (see Table 5). Second, the firm’s market share in heat 
production has larger retail price effects than in small house pricing.  The long run average 
price effect is close to 4 euros/kWt. Lastly, the scale of production price effect is pronounced 
but lack robustness. Unstable public ownership effects were also found.  
 
Table 5. Sum-up of apartment house energy pricing estimation results  
 
method/ 
variable 
OLS OLS / 
interac.
1st diff 
97-02 
1st diff 
98-99  
Panel
FE 
Panel 
RE 
Panel 
GMM 
Sum
 
TR   +    +/+     +    n.i    +     +    +   + 
TRL1999   -    -/-     -        -     -     -    - 
MSPROD     +    +/     +      +    +    +   + 
APARTMS      /+                      (+) 
CHP             +     (+)  
JOINT      n.i    n.i   n.i    n.i   n.i  
SUPPLY          n.i    n.i   n.i   n.i   n.i   
PUBLIC       +    n.i    -     ( ) ±
COMPANY       /-      -     (-) 
SCALE   -    - /+     +     -    +    -     -   ±
FUELCOST  +    +/-      +    +    +  + 
    (n.i. = not included in the model)  
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Table 6a. Pooled OLS-estimates for apartment house energy price setting  
 
 Variable                         estimate    t-value1)         estimate      t-value1)______ 
, 1
APART
i tP −                                          0.72      (14.96*)           0.69         (13.99*) 
 D00                                             9.86       (4.42*)            9.46          (4.38*) 
 D01                                             8.03       (3.61*)            5.89          (1.67*) 
 D10                                             9.32       (4.25*)            8.84          (4.13*) 
 D11                                           11.23       (4.33*)            6.21          (1.09) 
 D20                                             8.88        (4.36*)           8.46          (4.25*) 
 D21                                             9.77        (4.21*)           6.02           (0.87) 
 TR                                               0.57        (3.81*)           0.49           (3.19*) 
 TRL1999                                      -1.35       (-2.72*)         -0.96          (-2.00*) 
, 1
MS
i tPROD −                                     2.06        (3.18*)            2.37           (3.44*) 
, 1
MS
i tAPART −                                   0.06         (0.06)             0.89           (0.82) 
,i tCHP                                         -0.40        (-0.89)            0.03           (0.05) 
,i tJOINT                                     -0.06        (-0.12)            -0.15         (-0.25) 
,
F
i jSUPPLY                                 -0.03        (-0.14)            -0.04          (-0.18) 
,i tPUBLIC                                  0.14         (0.34)               0.46           (0.92) 
,i tCOMPANY                              0.53         (0.52)               0.82           (0.84) 
,i tSCALE                                   -0.04        (-2.98*)           -0.17          (-3.76*) 
,i tFUELCOST                             0.12         (3.15)*             0.15          (3.33*) 
,i tNETWORK *TR                                                             1.28            (2.94*) 
,i tNETWORK *TRL1999                                                    -3.92           (-2.12*) 
,i tNETWORK * , 1
MS
i tPROD −                                                 -2.28            (-0.53) 
,i tNETWORK * , 1
MS
i tAPART −                                               13.00            (2.09*) 
,i tNETWORK *                                                      -3.20            (-0.93) ,i tCHP
 *,i tNETWORK ,i tJOINT                                                  -4.51           (-0.69) 
,i tNETWORK *                                                2.94              (0.76) ,
F
i jSUPPLY
,i tNETWORK *                                               -0.68             (-0.72) ,i tPUBLIC
,i tNETWORK *                                            -5.28           (-3.29*) ,i tCOMPANY
,i tNETWORK *                                                    0.13            (2.54*) ,i tSCALE
,i tNETWORK *                                           -0.29          (-2.08*) ,i tFUELCOST
 R2                                                                                       0.699                             0.713 
 Breusch-Pagan heterog. test     : 207.9*          :   177.3* 2 (17)χ 2 (27)χ
 BJ normality test                        : 557.1*             :  540.4* 2 (2)χ 2 (2)χ
  Durbin Watson test                               2.45                                2.46 
 1) t-values corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 *) significant at 10% level   
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Table 6b. Tests for equality of distribution network sharing and regional  
                 specific effects (p-values in parenthesis) 
 
Overall equality: 
D00=D10=D20= 
D01=D11=D21 
Regional equality: 
D00=D10=D20, 
D01=D11=D21 
Network sharing / non sharing  
equality: 
D00=D01,D10=D11,D20=D21 
2 (5) 7.09   (0.214)χ =  2 (4) 6.19   (0.184)χ =        2 (3) 5.34   (0.147)χ =
 
 
Table 6c. Tests for equality of distribution network sharing and regional  
                specific effects in interaction model (p-values in parenthesis) 
 
Overall equality: 
D00=D10=D20= 
D01=D11=D21 
Regional equality: 
D00=D10=D20, 
D01=D11=D21 
Network sharing / non sharing  
equality: 
D00=D01,D10=D11,D20=D21 
2 (5) 6.21   (0.285)χ =  2 (4) 4.47   (0.351)χ =        2 (3) 2.36   (0.501)χ =
 
 
Table 6. First difference OLS model estimates for apartment house  
              energy price setting  
 
Variable                              estimate    t-value1)           estimate      t-value1) 
   
                                                    1997-2002                    1998-1999 
 
Constant                                  1.75         (7.62*)          -0.51         (-1.36) 
, 1
APART
i tP −Δ                                   -0.40       (-4.62*)          -0.44         (-2.64*) 
 D1999                                      -1.99       (-5.78*)                                         
, 1
MS
i tPROD −Δ                               3.03        (2.16*)            3.54           (0.70) 
, 1
MS
i tAPART −Δ                              3.83         (0.44)          -50.31         (-1.16) 
,i tCHPΔ                                   -0.64       (-0.75)             0.02           (0.02) 
,i tPUBLICΔ                             1.04         (4.04*)                                        
,i tCOMPANYΔ                         1.47         (0.76)            -0.88          (-2.21*) 
,i tSCALEΔ                               0.30         (2.52*)           -3.82          (-2.72*) 
,i tFUELCOSTΔ                      -0.08        (-1.51)             -0.07          (-0.46) 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 R2                                                                                    0.180                              0.305 
 Breusch-Pagan heterog. test    : 40.46*            :    6.75* 2 (9)χ 2 (7)χ
 BJ normality test                     : 265.65*           :   89.88*  2 (2)χ 2 (2)χ
 Durbin Watson test                               2.15                                  -  
 1) t-values corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 *) significant at 10% level   
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Table 7.  Panel model estimates for apartment house energy  price setting  
 
Variable               estimate   t-value1)     estimate   t-value1)      estimate   t-value1) 
 
                      FE: fixed effects model       RE: random effects model         GMMRE2) 
 
Constant                28.01       (6.00*)             8.18      (4.47*)            21.22      (3.73*) 
  
, 1
APART
i tP −                      0.16       (2.39*)             0.74      (16.41*)            0.97      (3.97*) 
 
 TR                          1.24         (7.15*)            0.54       (3.64*)            0.97      (3.97*) 
 TRL1999                 -2.19        (-4.29*)          -1.34      (-2.75*)          -1.98     (-3.13*) 
  
, 1
MS
i tPROD −                2.31          (1.94*)           1.75        (3.04*)            3.99      (3.34*) 
, 1
MS
i tAPART −              3.31           (0.46)            -0.41       (-0.36)           -1.75     (-1.10) 
,i tCHP                     0.25           (0.42)            0.02         (0.01)            -0.44    (-0.72) 
,i tPUBLIC              -2.61        (-2.01*)          0.22         (0.63)             0.36      (0.40) 
,i tCOMPANY            0.03        (0.06)             0.21         (0.30)              0.21     (0.26) 
 
,i tSCALE                  0.36         (2.47*)           -0.03       (-2.23*)         -0.07     (-3.22*) 
,i tFUELCOST          0.10         (1.99*)           0.13         (3.64*)           0.20       (3.62*) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
  R2                                                 0.809                            0.691                            0.727     
  Durbin Watson test       2.31                              2.44                             1.66   
  BJ normality test      :  316.10*  :  208.98*       :  501.11* 2 (2)χ 2 (2)χ 2 (2)χ
 1) t-values corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 2) J-statistics for instrumental adequacy:                                        2 (17) 8.19 χ =
     Instrument list: All trend, 0/1 variables and lags 1-2  
     of right hand side variables 
 *) significant at 10% level   
 
 
 
6. Conclusions  
We proposed an empirical econometric panel data model to test deregulation and regional 
market structure effects on district heating prices in Finland 1996-2002. On the general level 
results imply that the local structures of energy production and selling have an important role 
on retail market prices. The price lowering effects of energy market deregulation, started in 
1999, have been permanent. However many firm specific features like firm ownership, CHP, 
heat and electricity joint selling, firm being part of larger company, and scale of production 
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did not have unambiguous retail price effects. Although the main empirical results obtained 
preserve robustness and theory corroboration the large unobserved firm heterogeneity needs 
in future research more attention.   
 
The results showed also the housing type dependency. For small house district heat markets 
regional and distribution network sharing aspects are important but for apartment houses they 
are not. However for both house types, the market shares of local district heat production 
firms correlate positively with retail prices. The price effects of retail market shares of energy 
selling firms were not confirmed. A firm sharing a distribution network with other companies 
has stronger pricing effects with firm specific control variables than a non-sharing firm. 
Some network sharing firm specific effects were also found.          
 
From the policy perspective of market deregulation and industry restructuring the results are 
encouraging. The electricity market restructuring started in 1999, affecting district heating 
markets only indirectly, has lowered district heat housing prices. At the same time firm 
market shares – especially in wholesale markets - have still non-competitive price effects. As 
the district heating markets are highly localized with extended dependency, the market 
deregulation and industry restructuring may be impossible. Stronger regulation and market 
monitoring by the authorities may also in future be the only policy alternative.  
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Appendix I 
 
Distribution network-sharing and regional specific effects  
 
Following firm and region classifying variables are specified    
 
        (A1’)                   
0,  if  firm has own network       
1, if  firm shares the network    iNET
D ⎧= ⎨⎩
  and  
        (A1’’)               
0,  firm is located in Southern Finland                             
1,   firm is located on coastal side of  Finland                   
2,   firm is located in Eastern or Nothern Finland.          
iREGD =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
 
We can connect these variables in following way 
                                            
            (A2)                                   
             
0,0 0,1
1,0 1,1
2,0 2,1
iNET
iREG
D
D
 
 
giving parametric presentation  .   2 1 00 00 01 01 21 210 0 ..km kmk m a D a D a D a D= = = + + +∑ ∑
 
 
 
Appendix II  
 
Time dependent policy analysis in panel data 
 
2 period model 
 
Assume that we have observations from two time periods 1  and  2t t= = .  A policy change 
takes place at the beginning of period 2.  Letting i denote the cross section unit and t the time 
period. A one way panel data model with a single observed explanatory variable is  
 
 
         (A1)             0 * 12 ,     1, 2  and  1,2,.., ,it t it i ity d x a u t i Nβ δ β= + + + + = =     
 
      where                                                                                                                            
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0,   when 1
 2 ,    and 
1,   when  2
     measures cross section (unobserved)  heterogeneity effects, and 
    captures all other idiosyncratic and time-variyng unobserved effects.
t
i
it
t
d
t
a
u
=⎧= ⎨ =⎩
 
Thus at time period   the intercept is 2t = 0 *β δ+  measuring the impact of policy change on 
the level of .ity  Next if subtract the second period equation from the first, we obtain  
 
          (A2)                        2 1 * 1i i i i iy y y x uδ β− = Δ = + Δ + Δ , 
 
and read the policy effects form cross section OLS estimate of 0δ . This first-difference 
estimator has some advantages over the panel data model estimate (A1) since it has less 
parameters and consistency preserving condition for OLS, , disappears. If 
the cross section effects are of less importance the first difference model (A2) is a natural  
alternative for policy analysis (Wooldridge 2000).       
( , ) 0i itCorr a x =
 
Multi-period model 
 
Typically we have a panel data with many time periods 1, 2,.., *,..,t t T= , where a policy 
change takes place at the beginning of period .  Now a one way panel data model with p 
observed explanatory variables and year specific effects is   
*t
 
    (A3)      
0 2 * 1
1
2 ... * ... ( 1)
        ,  where   1,2,..., *,...   and  1,2,.., ,   and
it t T t T t
p
v vit i itv
y d dt d T dT
x a u t t T i N
β δ δ δ δ
β
−
=
= + + + + + − +
+ + + = =∑
 
 
                     
0,   when 1,
          2,3,..., *,.... .  
1,   when  ,      t
t t v
dv v t T
t v
= ≠⎧= =⎨ =⎩
Difference model takes now from of  
 
     (A4)        
2 * 1
1
2 ... * ... ( 1)
        ,     2,3,..., *,...   and  1,2,.., .
it t T t T t
p
v vit itv
y d dt d T dT
x u t t T i N
δ δ δ δ
β
−
=
Δ = Δ + + Δ + + Δ − + Δ
+ Δ + Δ = =∑
  
 
 
Model (A4) is problematic since it does not include a constant term and different yearly 
dummy variable takes different values in three year sequences. Likewise policy change year 
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*t  is treated similarly like other years. One solution to these problems is the following 
difference model  
 
 
     (A5)             
0 3 * 1
1
3 ... * .... ( 1)
        ,     2,3,..., *,...   and  1,2,.., .
it t T t T t
p
v vit itv
y d dt d T dT
x u t t T i N
β δ δ δ δ
β
−
=
Δ = + + + + + − +
+ Δ + Δ = =∑
 
 
 
A more efficient way to handle the policy issue is to use trend model like  
 
 
     (A6)                 
0 0 * * 1
,  
          1, 2,..., *,...   and  1, 2,.., ,    and  
p
it t t v vit i itv
t
y TR TRL x a u
TR t T i N
β δ δ β== + + + + +
= =
∑
    
                   *
0,   when *      
       
1,   when  *.     t
t t
TRL
t t
<⎧= ⎨ ≥⎩
 
 
The specification in (A6) means that all time depended effects in ity  are buried in a common 
time trend variable TRt  and a trend level shift takes place at policy change year t*.  Thus a 
trend break occurs at year t*  without affecting the slope of trend.  
 
Now the difference model has a form  
 
 
      (A7)                 
0 * * 1
,  
          2,..., *,...   and  1,2,.., ,     and  
p
it t v vit itv
y TRL x u
t t T i N
δ δ β=Δ = + Δ + Δ + Δ
= =
∑
    
                         *
0,  when *        
       
1,   when  *.     t
t t
TRL
t t
≠⎧Δ = ⎨ =⎩
 
Thus the policy change year  has its own specific, non permanent impulse, effect on *t t=
ityΔ , i.e. *δ ,  at year .   *t
 
 Inserting the regional-network dummies in level model above leads to  
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          (A8)            
2 1
0 * *0 0 1
,   
        where   1, 2,3,..., *,...,   and  1,2,.., .
p
it km km t t v vit i itk m v
y a D TR TRL x
t t T i N
δ δ β α= = == + + + +
= =
∑ ∑ ∑ u+
 
 
The corresponding difference model equals to Eq.A7) since regional-network dummies are 
constants in time. The cross-sections and time effects are measured by coefficients 
0 * 00 0 with reference to .km iα δ δ α α δ+ + + +  
 
 
Appendix III  
 
Data   
 
Our sample consists of 76 district heat producing firms in Finland (90% of all firms). Time 
dimension of data is 7 years (1996-2002) leading to panel data with number of observation of 
532.   
 
             Mean Std.Dev.  Skewness   Kurtosis  Minimum     Maximum 
__________________________________________________________________________  
 
PRICESMALL    53.72  7.32  0.74  4.11 38.76 83.22  
PRICEAPART  41.00  5.77  0.61  3.78 26.56 61.99  
PRODMS   0.63  0.42 -0.41       1.31  0.00  1.00  
SMALLMS     0.05  0.06  1.49  4.39  0.00   0.27  
APARTMS   0.52   0.18 -0.16  2.66  0.04  0.92  
SCALE 357.79    873.09  5.82 42.61  6.83    7224.11  
FUELCOST  15.24  6.87  1.63  5.89  7.04 45.07  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
kmD -stratification divides the number of firms to following cross regional and network 
sharing variable cell numbers  
 
 
                               
  
19
20
37
67 9 76
own network joint network
south
coast
north
18 1
14 6
35 2
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Appendix IV  
 
Results from OLS-estimation without -dummies and from unbalanced panel estimation 
with - cross section stratification   
kmD
kmD
 
 
   Table IVA. Pooled data OLS and panels data -estimates of small house  
                       energy price setting (Dkm –stratification)  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                           OLS                              FE                               RE                             
  
Constant                      11.31     (2.33*)             18.98    (6.78*)          17.25       (7.86*)  
, 1
SMALL
i tP −                            0.62    (12.41*)              0.53     (9.04*)           0.57     (16.49*)  
 TR                                 0.36     (1.82*)              1.05     (5.22*)           1.04        (5.00*)  
 TRL99                          -1.56    (-1.92*)             -1.88    (-3.16*)         -1.90       (-2.26*)  
, 1
MS
i tPROD −                       3.52      (3.11*)              3.09     (3.34*)           3.11        (4.11*)    
, 1
MS
i tSMALL −                     0.38       (0.69)              -1.15    (-0.23)           -1.13      (-0.27) 
,i tCHP                            0.75       (1.40)               0.63      (1.06)            0.64        (0.36)   
,i tJOINT                       -0.17     (-0.39)               0.25      (0.59)             0.19       (0.44) 
,
F
i jSUPPLY                     0.04       (4.82*)          -0.16      (-0.47)          -0.09        (-0.28)   
,i tPUBLIC                     0.33      (0.64)              -0.06    (-0.12)             0.08         (0.23)  
,i tCOMPANY                 1.43      (1.74*)              1.79     (2.12*)           1.74        (2.09*)  
,i tSCALE                      -0.04     (-2.91*)            -0.06     (-2.36*)         -0.05      (-1.75*) 
               0.28      (5.43*)             0.24      (5.24*)           0.25        (6.14*)  ,i tFUELCOST
________________________________________________________________________ 
  R2                                                                       0.639                          0.655                             0.669 
 Breusch-Pagan heterog. test  : 240.4*           2 (17)χ
 BJ normality test                    : 456.7*          :  287.2*         :  212.5*          2 (2)χ 2 (2)χ 2 (2)χ
  Durbin Watson test                     1.79                            1.82                               1.92  
 1) t-values corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 *) significant at 10% level   
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   Table IVB. Pooled data OLS and panels data -estimates of apartment  
                       house energy price setting (Dkm –stratification)  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                 OLS                              FE                              RE                              
 
Constant                              13.91       (6.53*)         10.12       (9.12*)          8.81       (8.79*) 
, 1
APART
i tP −                                    0.59     (12.75*)            0.70    (14.79*)          0.71     (19.21*) 
 TR                                         0.62       (3.63*)            0.50       (2.73*)         0.47       (2.76*) 
 TRL1999                                -1.53     (-2.78*)          -1.31       (-1.96*)       -1.30      (-2.02*) 
, 1
MS
i tPROD −                               2.44       (3.96*)            2.13        (3.33*)         2.02        3.94*) 
, 1
MS
i tAPART −                             1.74        (1.44)              0.61       (0.23)           0.33       (0.12) 
,i tCHP                                   -0.55      (-0.65)            -0.35       (-0.63)         -0.11       (-0.22) 
,i tJOINT                               -0.62       (-1.07)            -0.38      (-0.75)          -0.51      (-0.70) 
,
F
i jSUPPLY                             0.04        (4.07*)          -0.02      (-0.07)           0.05       (0.19) 
,i tPUBLIC                             0.18        (0.45)              0.15      (0.38)            0.32       (0.77)  
,i tCOMPANY                         1.06        (0.18)              1.09     (1.67*)           1.07      (1.51) 
,i tSCALE                               -0.07      (-4.11*)          -0.03     (-1.03)           -0.03     (-1.15) 
,i tFUELCOST                        0.15        (4.47*)            0.13     (4.87*)           0.15     (5.21*) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
  R2                                                                       0.573                          0.683                             0.678 
 Breusch-Pagan heterog. test  : 127.0*           2 (17)χ
 BJ  normality test                   : 211.2*          :  187.6*         :  204.2*          2 (2)χ 2 (2)χ 2 (2)χ
  Durbin Watson test                     1.93                            1.94                               1.92  
 1) t-values corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 *) significant at 10% level   
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